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"Not Form, But Function:
How Leaders in the Age of Jefferson Differ From Those of Today"
9homas Jefferson and his generation of American leaders were fundamentally different from
leaders today. By virtue of their presence at, and participation in, the creation of the American republic
and the subsequent formative years of the new nation, Jefferson's generation was compelled to take
action not required by leaders today: namely, they were obliged. to set precedents for the new America
based upon the blueprints (Declaration ofIndependence, Constitution) that they created. These precedents
have had far-reaching effects, even until today. Essentially, then, I believe Jefferson's generation
had a very different role, in terms of its peculiar obligations, than do leaders today. In Jefferson's time,
American leaders bore, as a result of their being the first American leaders, the incredible two-fold
responsibility of not only creating the republic but also of ensuring its future survival. Today's leaders
are charged with a comparably great responsibility, but one that is concerned more with the maintenance
and perpetuation of the principles espoused by the Founding Fathers. Whereas the elite cadre who
convened at the constitutional convention more than two hundred years ago were by definition innovators,
today's leaders have accepted for the good of the country a decidedly more imitative, although not
completely dissimilar role.
gn truth, the imitative nature of modern leaders is often unavoidable in light of precedents set by
leaders of the Jeffersonian era. In terms of governmental power, this imitation gives rise to certain
parallels between leaders then and now. The problem, of course, is that Jefferson and Hamilton didn't
live in the late twentieth century. As Joseph J. Ellis points out in American Sphinx: The Character of
Thomas J~fferson, "All efforts to wrench Jefferson out of his own time and place ... are futile and misguided
ventures that invariable compromise the integrity of the historical context that made him what he was"
(Ellis, American Sphinx, 1997, 292). Jefferson, and most of the leaders of his time, were neither saints
nor heretics, and although they are ever present in the modern political arena because of their precedents
and visionary world view, they need not be canonized as either. In the end, they were similar to modern
American leaders in form but different in function. So, instead of asking what the leaders in Jefferson's
time would do today, a better question might be, "What did they do in their own time that illuminates
and informs our understanding of contemporary American political life?" Two issues stand out as
significant in comparing and contrasting these eras: foreign policy and domestic policy.
gn terms of foreign policy during Jefferson's time, the passage of the Jay Treaty (1795) provides
an interesting insight into what Joseph J. Ellis calls "simultaneously a landmark in the shaping of American
foreign policy, [and] a decisive influence on the constitutional question of executive power in foreign
affairs" (Ellis, American Sphinx, 157). The Jay Treaty removed duties on English imports, retained
English tarriffs on American exports to England, and held the United States liable for pre-Revolutionary
debt. Jefferson was strongly against the treaty, which he saw as "a repudiation of the Declaration of
Independence," whereas Alexander Hamilton was "its major advocate" (Ellis, American Sphinx, 159),
which sheds light on another reality: that much like today, in Jefferson's time leaders were very different
from each other. In fact, as Richard Hofstadter, Norman Risjord, and Joyce Appleby have noted, these
ideological oppositions which would eventually culminate in the American party system are not unlike
current ideological debates.
What is different, however, is that at the time of the Jay Treaty the United States didn't resemble
the twentieth century United States geographically, economically, or otherwise. As John M. Murrin says
in his essay "A Roof Without Walls," "American national identity was, in short, an unexpected, impromptu,
artificial, and therefore an extremely fragile creation of the Revolution" (Murrin, Beyond
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, 1987,344). It was a different
country whose relative instability at the time tended to magnify the ramifications of any political decisions,
but especially with regard to foreign policy, as it had not yet been liberated from the burden of
England's economic yoke. In this sense though, perhaps the political structure was the one concrete
aspect of American life that bears more than passing resemblance to modern America.
One modern parallel to the foreign policy questions posed by the Jay Treaty is the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 which created a free trade zone from Guatamala to the
Artic Ocean. The parallel illuminates two realities. First, in all but the most landmark foreign policy
decisions, post-Jeffersonian leaders are bound to take an imitative role in terms of detailed political
protocol. Moreover, because this role in modern America is inherently repetitive, based on principles
and assumptions initially embraced by Jeffersonian statesmen, today's leaders are forced to look back
two-hundred years, if only in the rhetorical abstract, to affect modern policy. Jefferson, Adams,
Hamilton, and Madison were not bound by this construct, and although they relied on time honored
models of statecraft, did so according to the new and unique context of republicanism. Second, precisely
because America was so different in Jefferson's time, the essential function of modern leaders differs as
well, lending itself in this case to the economic advantage of North American market consolidation. It
differs functionally from the Jay Treaty in that America's relative global economic prowess has increased
exponentially since the Jay Treaty signing. This dichotomy in time between similar forms of leadership
encompassing different functions does not limit itself to foreign policy.
gn terms of domestic policy during Jefferson's time, Hamilton's banking policies of the early
1790's stand out. Hamilton's fiscal programs presented an interesting conundrum, especially in a newly
revolutionary nation, in the sense that they effectively increased the power of the federal government,
and by so doing, limited the power of its citizenry through taxation. Edmund S. Morgan points to this
in Inventing the People, when he says, "Alexander Hamilton's fiscal program ... had the effect of requiring
the national government to engage in heavier taxation than many, perhaps most Americans, thought
necessary" (Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America, 1988,
285). Again, the dilemma between individual liberty and the cohesion of centralized federal power takes
on a more palpable significance when seen in the light of an economically and politically vulnerable early
America.
~exander Hamilton's banking policies of the early 1790s present another instance in which
America and modern leaders have been shaped. Richard Hofstadter says ofJefferson's reticence to
reverse Federalist reforms, "The Hamiltonian system ... had become part of the American economy. The
nation was faring well" (Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, 1948,34). Hofstadter goes on to
say, "To unscramble Hamilton's system of funding, banks, and revenues would precipitate a bitter
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struggle, widen the breach between the classes and .. .it might bring a depression, perhaps even rend the
Union" (Hofstadter, 34). Hamilton's system of financial programs effectively increased the power of the
federal government, but also evolved into a system that is, in many ways, indispensable in modern
America. Jefferson's opposition to Hamilton's policy (and to Hamilton himself) is not unlike differences
in modern leadership, most notably the shift in social program appropriations from Reagan to
Clinton. Joyce O. Appleby says that "where Republicans differed from Federalists was in the moral
character of economic development. The promise in prosperity encouraged them to vault over the
cumulative wisdom of the ages and imagine a future far different from the dreary past known to man"
(Appleby, Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1992, 76). Also, their longer view for America, whether
conscious or inadvertent, is evident in the longevity of their original policies, ideas, and principles. That
modern leadership has deferred to these revolutionary predecessors in so many cases and on many levels
is indicative of the prescience of that view, even though modern political thought has evolved so greatly.
gn any discussion of modern parallels to the Hamiltonian finance system, it would be remiss to
omit mention of Ronald Reagan's program of supply-side economics in the 1980s, which certainly seems
Hamiltonian in its thrust, and also ironically Jeffersonian in its rhetoric. Of course, Reagan had the
luxury of commanding a superpower, and this fact enabled him to implement massive tax cuts, the
major consequence of which was that the nation incurred a huge deficit. This was a luxury not afforded
to Hamilton and a result he would not have entertained lightly.
Jiistorian Joseph J. Ellis sums it up nicely when he says, "The entire political landscape of
twentieth century America would have struck Jefferson as alien" (Ellis, 298). He says further that
"Jefferson created a particular style of leadership adapted to the special requirements of American political
culture that remains relevant two centuries later. It is astyle based on the capacity to rest comfortably
with contradictions" (Ellis 301). So, in sum, leaders today have a similar role to leaders in the age of
Jefferson in terms of form, but one that is different in terms of function.
Works Cited
Appleby, Joyce. "Jefferson and His Complex Legacy." Ieffersonian Legacies. Ed. Peter S. Onu£ Charlottesville:
University Virginia Press, 1993. 1-16
Appleby, Joyce. "Capitalism and the Rise of the Republican Opposition." Major Problems in the Early
Republic 1787-1848. Ed. Sean Wilentz.Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1992. 75-84.
Elkins, Stanley and Eric McKitrick, Eds. The Age of Federalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Ellis, Joseph. American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Iefferson. New York: Knopf, 1997.
Hofstadter, Richard. The American Political Tradition. New York: Vintage Books, 1948.
Koch, Adrienne. Iefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration. New York: Knopf, 1950.
Morgan, Edmund. Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Soverignty in England and America.
New York: WW Norton and Company, 1988.
Murrin, John. ''A Roof Without Walls." Beyond Confederation. Ed. Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and
Edward C. Carter II. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987.333-348.